The Paradox of Observing, Autopoiesis, and the Future of Social Sciences by Shkliarevsky, Gennady
SystemsResearch andBehavioral Science
Syst. Res.24, 323^332 (2007)
Published online inWiley InterScience
(www.interscience.wiley.com)DOI:10.1002/sres.811& ResearchPaperThe Paradox of Observing, Autopoiesis,
and The Future of Social SciencesGennady Shkliarevsky*
Department of History, Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, NY, USA*Cor
Bard
E-ma
CopThe current debate in social sciences show that the paradox of observing—the embedd-
edness of observer in the process of observing—is at the heart of the controversy about
their cognitive status and future. Although the problem of observing has been addressed
in numerous theoretical perspectives—some of which (Habermas, Leydesdorff,
Maturana, and Luhmann) are examined in this article—the prospects for resolving this
paradox remain problematic. Locating a point, which allows reflection on the process of
autopoiesis in general, not just the operation of a particular autopoietic system, may be one
condition for resolving this paradox. Such point will offer reflection on all autopoietic
systems, including the observer. The dynamic balance between equilibrium and disequi-
librium is the mechanism, which regulates the process of autopoiesis. Since the function of
regulation is essentially a reflective function, this equilibrium between equilibrium and
disequilibrium, which can be identified with the concept of homeorhesis introduced by
Conrad Waddington, may offer a possibility to reflect on the process of observing.
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Contemporary debates about social sciences
reveal serious disagreements about their
cognitive status and future. Whether these
disagreements amount to a crisis or are as
unprecedented in the history of social sciencesrespondence to: Gennady Shkliarevsky, Department of History,
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yright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.as some observers and participants conclude, is a
matter of contention. However, few will disagree
that the current debates raise issues that go to the
heart of the field of social studies as it was
defined and codified at least since the middle of
the nineteenth century.
Although one could justifiably argue that
distant rumblings of these debates could be
heard even before World War II, there is hardly
any doubt that the main storm gathered and
reached its peak in the years after it (Novick,
1999). Triggered by the feminist, post-
structuralist, and post-modern critiques of theReceived 28 August 2005
Accepted 23 October 2006
RESEARCHPAPER Syst. Res.social sciences, the current debates seem to
have fermented in the broad changes in the
institutional status, cognitive apparatus, and
epistemological approaches of social sciences,
as well as, more generally, in the growing
awareness of autonomy and agency character-
istic of the cultural climate that emerged after the
Second World War.
Although the debates have been going on for
quite some time, their shrillness shows no
signs of abatement, as arguments and mutual
accusations continue to be traded across the fault
lines and reputations continue to be created and
destroyed. It is the sustained intensity and
acrimony of these debates that cause some
observers to regard them as a genuine crisis in
social sciences (Appleby et al., 1994).
The participants in these debates fall into
two principal, largely self-defined groups: repre-
sentationalists and anti-representationalists.
Representationalists defend the capacity of social
sciences to establish a fundamental correspon-
dence between our knowledge about society and
the social ‘out-there’, and to capture in their
categories and interpretations the elusive object
of their investigation. Their opponents argue
that since social reality, just as any other reality, is
not directly accessible to human mind and has to
be mediated by and refracted through mental
constructs, social sciences in principle cannot
make any hegemonic claims regarding the
veracity of the knowledge they produce.
It is difficult to read the contributions to these
debates without taking sides. Since neither
representationalists nor anti-representationalists
invite reconciliation, many readers do take sides.
There have been few, if any, attempts at a
synthesis or a definitive resolution of the conflict.
As an impartial observer reads through various
contributions to these debates, he or she cannot
help wondering about the source of the con-
troversy. What is at the root of these debates?
Why are they taking place? Why are they so
acrimonious? Will the controversy ever be
resolved? Those who see these debates as a sign
of crisis may be wondering if social sciences will
ever overcome it or perish in the barren land-
scape of mutual destruction. Some even pro-
phesy the end of social sciences. Keith JenkinsCopyright  2007 JohnWiley & Sons,Ltd.
324finds it easy to imagine, for example, that history
as a field of inquiry may be ‘just local, temporary
phenomena’ that will cease to exist ‘in a 100 or
200 years time’ (Jenkins, 2000, p. 198).
One interesting fact that strikes an observer is
that the two sides have more in common than
may appear at first glance: they share many
fundamental assumptions, use the same founda-
tional texts, and have similar values and political
loyalties. And yet, they find absolutely no
possibility for reconciliation. The exchange that
took place a few years ago on the pages of
the journal History and Theory between the
representationalist Perez Zagorin and the anti-
representationalist Keith Jenkins is a good case in
point (Zagorin, 1998; Jenkins, 2000).
Looking past mutual misconceptions, accusa-
tions (justified and unjustified), and misrepresen-
tations, an analysis of the substantive arguments
in this debate reveals how much the two sides
have in common. For example, just like the
representationalist Zagorin, the anti-represent-
ationalist Jenkins believes that there is such a
thing as reality, which exists independently of our
minds. Jenkins, with Richard Rorty, has no
problem accepting that ‘the world exists inde-
pendent of, and is irreducible to, human mental
states’ (Jenkins, 2000, p. 184). In his words, ‘not a
single ‘‘postmodernist’’ . . . is actually an anti-
realist’ (Jenkins, 2000, p. 183). One may doubt the
validity of Jenkins’ conclusion, as Zagorin does in
his subsequent ‘Rejoinder’, but one can hardly
doubt what Jenkins is saying in this quote.
Just like Jenkins, Zagorin ‘finds no difficulty in
recognizing that, for example, any entity, event,
object, or work of imagination can be described in
different ways, depending on one’s interest, the
questions one asks, one’s criteria of relevance,
and so on’ (Zagorin, 2000, p. 206). For all his
advocacy of objective truth, his claims that a
correspondence between reality and knowledge
can be attained, and his defense of the capacity
of normal historical practice to reconstruct
historical reality (Zagorin, 1998, p. 10), Zagorin
concedes that writing history involves the
creative agency of the historian, and hence is
affected by subjectivity (Zagorin, 1998, p. 21). He
admits to the constructed nature of human
perceptions and even regards human constructsSyst. Res.24, 323^332 (2007)
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example, that ‘narrative sequence or structure
may be regarded as in some measure an attribute
of the events themselves’ (Zagorin, 1998, p. 20).
Both authors pay their respect to sound
practices of historical writing, such as logical
presentation and use of facts and reference
apparatus. Both accept the notion of non-
transparency of language. Yet, despite all these
similarities, they do their best to convince the
reader that there can hardly be more irreconcil-
able positions than those they represent.
One can start an analysis of the exchange with
an observation that both contributors operate
within essentially the same intellectual universe
based on binary oppositions (for example,
between mind and reality, nature and culture).
They draw their diametrically opposed perspect-
ives—one that insists that a correspondence
between reality and knowledge is possible and
the other, which deems such correspondence
impossible—from essentially the same con-
ception of knowledge. Both of them recognize
the constructed nature of knowledge. However,
as real as the process of constructing knowledge
is for both authors, they have difficulty in
considering it as part of objective reality. This
similarity is particularly evident in their treat-
ment of fact. Zagorin is disquieted by what he
regards as the ultimate postmodernist statement
that there is nothing outside the text, which, to
him, implies that ‘historical facts are products of
discourse’ (Zagorin, 1998, p. 20). In his view, facts
are part of the extra-discursive reality and they
derive their essential meaning from that
reality (although one may be wondering how
Zagorin reconciles this view of fact with his
general acceptance of the constructed nature of
perception).
Jenkins’ approach towards facts is more
consistent with his view of knowledge as
constructed. For him, words which give meaning
to historical, social, or for that matter any other
facts, are part of discursive, not objective reality.
In contrast to objective reality which, according
to Jenkins, is ‘out there’ and which we cannot
capture in our concepts and categories, the
discursive reality is relativistic and, hence, the
meaning of facts which appear within this reality,Copyright  2007 JohnWiley & Sons,Ltd.
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relative.
At first glance one may see no similarity
between these two positions. Jenkins, for whom
facts and their meanings are part of discursive
reality, asserts that this meaning has little to do
with whatever exists ‘out there’. For Zagorin,
the essential meaning of facts, just like facts
themselves, is extra-discursive. In other words,
such essential meaning is implicit in facts and is,
therefore, unconstructed. However, on close
analysis the two positions seem to be derived
from the same inconsistent view of the process of
constructing knowledge: they regard the process
of construction as real but see no way of relating
its products to what they understand as objective
reality. For Jenkins, if facts are constructed, then
they are not real but are mere conventions.
Zagorin, who accepts the givenness of facts,
follows essentially the same logic and exempts
the essential meaning of facts from the act of
construction.
The common inconsistency with regard to
construction of knowledge suggests that both
authors stumble over the same problem which is
related to observing. For both Jenkins and
Zagorin, observing is not a passive reception of
external information. They both recognize that
the act of observing is an act of construction and
therefore involves the subjectivity of the obser-
ver. However, the recognition of subjectivity
creates a problem. Claims of objective knowledge
require that the process of observing should be
also included in the field of vision of the observer.
Yet, in the mental universe of both authors there
is no position which would allow the observer to
observe the observing. For this reason, the
recognition of subjectivity undermines any claim
of objective knowledge. Neither Jenkins nor
Zagorin resolves this problem. They merely
dismiss it. While Jenkins denies any possibility
of objective knowledge (since there is no
possibility of observing the observing) and rejects
correspondence between reality and representa-
tions, Zagorin simply removes the observer
from the act of observing/constructing the
essential meaning of facts. This essential mean-
ing, according to Zagorin, is what makes
objective representation possible. In his view,Syst. Res.24, 323^332 (2007)
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facts but not facts themselves. The exchange
between Jenkins and Zagorin also suggests that
these palliatives do not satisfy their respective
proponents. Both are troubled by the internal
inconsistency, which destabilizes their respective
positions. Rather than recognize this fact, they
blame each other’s position, and not their own
inconsistency, for destabilizing social sciences.
Incidentally, this projection of their own insecu-
rities on each other may explain the acrimony of
the debate which has no resolution because both
sides refuse to deal with the real source of
perturbation.
The analysis of the exchange between Jenkins
and Zagorin shows that the source of the
controversy between representationalists and
anti-representationalists is the status of the
observer, more specifically the embeddedness
of the observer in the process of observing. Any
claim of objectivity requires a critical stance. That
is, the act of observing must include an
observation of the act of observing. However,
an act of observing inescapably embeds the
observer in the process of observing. The
question then is: How can one be embedded in
the process of observing and yet be able to
observe it? Where can one locate a position which
would allow such double observing? Is it
possible to observe the observing without getting
into an infinite reflective regression? Neither
representationalists nor anti-representationalists
answer these questions. Both sides have been
unable to resolve the paradox of observing.
Reliance on normative practice of social scientists
recommended by the representationalists (which
is also fully supported by the anti-repre-
sentationalists) is highly problematic since this
approach implies that an observation of facts is
an operation which is completely different from
an observation of their relationships. The anti-
representationalists emphasize this point. How-
ever, their solution is also hardly a solution: they
merely refuse to allow the paradox of observing
to dominate over the creative enterprise of social
scientists. As the example of the exchange
between Zagorin and Jenkins shows, both sides
seem to be troubled by their own internal
inconsistencies which destabilize their positions,Copyright  2007 JohnWiley & Sons,Ltd.
326yet refuse to recognize them (as evidenced by
the fact that their respective positions include
propositions which are very similar to those they
criticize in their opponent’s perspective). The fear
of internal instability may be the factor that fans
the vehemence of these debates. Both sides
project their fears and insecurities on each other
and regard each other as an external source of
perturbation.SOME THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
THE PARADOX OF OBSERVING
The paradox of observing has surfaced in a
variety of theoretical perspectives which deal
with construction of knowledge. In his theory of
communication Habermas argues in support of
a possibility of objective knowledge, which
involves a critical stance of the observer.
According to Habermas, language used in
accordance with the rules of rational discourse
may allow the observer to overcome his or her
own limitations and attain knowledge which
would have universal validity. Language,
according to Habermas, has a complex structure
that makes communication possible both on the
psychic level and on the level of social systems.
This complex structure allows language to serve
as an integrating operator which, when used in
accordance with norms of rationality, can result
in a genuine consensus and an objective repres-
entation of reality. For Habermas, this consensus
is counterfactual—a mere idealization that
should guide us in our aspiration toward
objective knowledge and genuine social progress
(Habermas, 1985).
Habermas’ philosophical and sociological
views have been strongly influenced by the
theoretical legacy of Jean Piaget. In his essay
‘Toward a Reconstruction of Historical Materi-
alism’, for example, Habermas recognizes his
debt to the father of genetic epistemology when
he writes: ‘Only the genetic structuralism worked
out by Piaget, which investigates the develop-
mental logic behind the process in which
structures are formed, builds a bridge to
historical materialism’ (Habermas, 1979, p. 169).
According to the theory of communicative action,Syst. Res.24, 323^332 (2007)
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It is predicated on the ideals of truth, objectivity
and rationality. These ideals are implicit in formal
logical operations which, according to Piaget, are
characteristic of the later stages of the child’s
development (Piaget, 1965). In his discussions of
the development of formal logical operations,
Piaget has emphasized that they evolve from
concrete operations which are ultimately rooted in
the organism’s physiology and biology, i.e. in the
sphere of unconscious functions of the organism.
It is not clear why Habermas has chosen to make
changes in this sequence and regard as the
fundamental condition for communication, and
hence social life, what Piaget considers a product
of a long evolution which involves social inter-
actions.
Misappropriating Piaget’s theory and positing
as the initial condition what, for Piaget, is a
product of a long evolution makes Habermas’
theoretical endeavour look like another founda-
tional meta-narrative. Piaget’s theoretical pers-
pective hardly lends itself to foundationalism.
Foundational meta-narratives are characterized
by an epistemological approach which is pre-
dicated on a transcendent position of the
observer and precludes a critical stance toward
his or her own act of observing. The position of
the observer lies entirely outside the plane of
interpretation. This certainly makes it impossible
to observe the observing. Habermas, for example
does not explain his foundational proposition
regarding the possibility of communication.
Piaget does not make such foundational claims.
According to his theory, there is no foundational
moment, for example in the rise of conscious-
ness; it gradually emerges from sensory-motor
operations which in turn have their origin in
physiological functions and biology of the
organism (Piaget, 1971). Piaget shows that
consciousness and reason have their roots in
the processes of conservation and regulation of
the biological functions of the organism and
hence in the sphere of the irrational and
unconscious.
Habermas has failed to resolve the paradox of
observing. As a result, rather than being part of
the solution, his theory has become part of the
controversy. This failure has opened his theory toCopyright  2007 JohnWiley & Sons,Ltd.
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challenged Habermas’s rationalist approach
to communication (Knodt, 1995). Others have
charged that his theory lacks a critical dimension
and represents just another foundational meta-
narrative which is logo- and Eurocentric, despite
the importance he attributes to peripheral
groups, such as women and minorities, in
constituting more equal and autonomous
relations (Delanty, 1997).
In his stimulating and imaginative use of a
cybernetic approach, Loet Leydesdorff attempts
to close a metaphysical divide constructed
by Habermas between ‘those who believe in
‘‘linguisitically generated intersubjectivity’’ and
the adherents of ‘‘self-referentially closed sys-
tems’’’ (Leydesdorff, 2000, p. 280) and to
elaborate on the integrative function of language
which Habermas considers central for the
development of communicative competence.
He provides a valuable theoretical insight
into the conditions that ensure the evolution
of communication and the construction of
knowledge through reflexive coding of comm-
unications. His theoretical perspective envisions
a possibility for an observer/participant who can
function simultaneously in the infra-reflexive
(external observer) and hyper-reflexive (internal
observer) modes. According to Leydesdorff, such
dual functioning allows the observer/participant
to establish correlatives between the two modes
of observing. Differences between these modes
open possibilities for a further development of
the observer/participant as an autopoietic sys-
tem and an enhancement of his or her commu-
nicative competence.
However, Leydesdorff’s theoretical insights
into the process of constructing knowledge do
not resolve the paradox of observing. He does not
indicate where in his theoretical vision, which
allows only an observation of the observing on
the preceding level of stabilization of an autop-
oietic system, one might find a position from
which an act of one’s own observation can be
observed.
Leydesdorff’s elaboration on the integrative
function of language raises another important
issue. Like Habermas, he does not make clear
why he considers language to be in the privilegedSyst. Res.24, 323^332 (2007)
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As a symbolic system, language regulates social
interactions. But so do politics, economics,
cultural and moral norms, and other symbolic
systems. Just like any other system, language
must have its own regulatory mechanism; in
other words, it also requires a system that would
stabilize linguistic operations and open possibi-
lities for a further development of the autopoietic
process. The regulatory mechanism of linguistic
operations, which makes a reflection on these
operations possible, in turn gives rise to its own
regulatory mechanism, as a reflection on reflec-
tion. There is no reason to consider linguistic
operations in any way superior to other symbolic
systems. The fact that language can be used to
explain the operation of a higher level systems
testifies to the remarkable capacity of any lower
level system (linguistic or not) to adapt to a
higher-level one. Hence there is no reason to
suppose that language can provide the ultimate
regulatory mechanism which can permit reflec-
tion and control of the autopoietic process itself.
On the contrary, as an instance of this process,
language is embedded in it and therefore
linguistic operations act recursively only on
social interactions as the level which precedes
them.
Humberto Maturana—a Chilean biologist
who, together with Francisco Varela, is the
creator of the theory of autopoiesis—offers a
radically different perspective on the problem of
observing. Similarly to anti-representationalists,
Maturana maintains that it is impossible and
unnecessary to talk about our knowledge as
representing some objective reality. Knowledge,
in his view, simply represents consensual state-
ments which are valid only within the com-
munity of observers who produced them. In
Maturana’s words, ‘science or the domain of
scientific statements does not need an objective
independent reality, nor does it reveal one’
(Maturana, 1988, 4.ii.A).
Maturana derives his radical conclusion from
his observations, as a neurophysiologist, of
neural activity, which, in his view, lies at the
core of knowledge production. Nervous systems,
Maturana observes, ‘are closed systems and,
accordingly, do not offer means for the descrip-Copyright  2007 JohnWiley & Sons,Ltd.
328tion of an objective reality’ (Maturana, 1978, 55).
Since, he argues, ‘a closed neuronal network
cannot discriminate between internally and
externally triggered changes in relative neuronal
activity’, for the operation of the nervous system
(an organism), there cannot be a distinction
between illusions, hallucinations or perceptions
(Maturana, 1978, 46). Therefore, he concludes, all
knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is
‘merely metaphorical and carries no explanatory
value’ (Maturana, 1978, 45). Maturana is
unflinching in his epistemological relativism.
Even his own theoretical views do not escape the
radicalism of his conclusions:
. . . in the process of being a scientist explaining
cognition as a biological phenomenon, I shall
proceed without using the notion of objectivity
to validate what I say, that is, I shall put
objectivity in parenthesis. In other words, I
shall go on using object language because this
is the only language that we have (and can
have), but although I shall use the experience
of being in language as my starting point while
I use language to explain cognition and
language, I shall not claim that what I say is
valid because there is an independent objec-
tive reality that validates it (Maturana, 1988,
5.ii).
The theory of autopoiesis has wide appli-
cations and is very important for our under-
standing of the production of knowledge.
According to Maturana, the autopoietic system
is a unity defined ‘by relations that constitute it
as a network of processes of production of
components which: (a) recursively participate
through their interactions in the generation and
realization of the network of processes of
production of components which produced
them; and (b) constitute this network of processes
of production of components as a unity in the
space in which they (the components) exist by
realizing its boundaries’ (Maturana, 1974, 153).
Maturana underscores the dynamic nature of
the autopoietic system which conserves its
autopoietic organization by reproducing it. Such
reproduction of its organization enables the
autopoietic system to evolve, or to produce itself,
and the process by which it produces itself is theSyst. Res.24, 323^332 (2007)
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production of knowledge is just one example
of autopoiesis.
The conceptualization of cognition as a self-
generating process is a very valuable insight.
However, while helping us understand better the
production of knowledge, Maturana denies it
any objective validity. For him, there is no point
from which an observer can observe the observ-
ing. Hence objective knowledge, for him, is in
principle impossible.
Maturana’s conclusion is problematic even in
the context of his own theory. Maturana, for
example, recognizes that autopoietic systems
have plasticity and are capable of adaptation.
Therefore, they are not entirely closed and
are capable of knowing something—at least to
the degree specified by their own self-
referentiality—about the reality external to them.
Indeed, Maturana sees that the autopoietic
system is capable of transcending its own
limitations through structural coupling. How-
ever, quite uncharacteristically, he offers no
rational reasons for such transcendence and
invokes the moral sentiment of love in his
explanation of the impetus for it. Also, while
one may be in agreement with the notion that
symbolic operations ultimately originate in
biological functioning of the organism, which
is central to Maturana’s theoretical perspective,
one may be less convinced that the domains of
psychological functions and symbolic operations
do not have their own specific capacities and may
be more open than the biological functions.
Maturana’s insistence on similarities between
biological and cognitive autopoiesis does not
prove that the degree of closure or openness of
psychological and symbolic operations, which
are regulatory in relation to the biological
domain, is the same as in biological operations.
Finally, if indeed biological functions give rise to
psychological and symbolic operations, Matur-
ana does not explain the presence of the notion of
objectivity in human knowledge from a bio-
logical perspective.
Despite similarities between the positions on
the problematic of observing between Maturana
and Niklas Luhmann, the latter’s treatment of
this subject is more nuanced than Maturana’s,Copyright  2007 JohnWiley & Sons,Ltd.
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(Leydesdorff, 2000). Leydesdorff argues that
Luhmann simply imported the biological model
of Maturana into the field of sociology and that he
‘is behaving as a super-observer who claims to be
able to detach himself (like a biologist) from
the meaning provided by the participants in
the systems that he observes’ (Leydesdorff, 2000,
p. 278). Like Maturana, Luhmann is fully aware
of self-referentiality of knowledge and that
observation is a function of the observer as an
autopoietic system (Luhmann, 1995). He under-
stands that the circularity of observing is
unavoidable but, unlike Maturana, he argues
that it can be interrupted by introducing
conditioning. Such conditioning is a proper
function of reason, or rather reasons, as Luhmann
puts it. He is perfectly aware that rationality is
not a panacea. In his words, rational conditioning
merely transforms ‘the vicious circle into an
infinite regress’ since ‘one must ask for the
reasons behind the reasons’ (Luhmann, 1995,
p. 479). However, for Luhmann this infinite
regress ‘is fitted with hopes of approximating
ever more closely to reality, which are finally
anchored in functioning complexity’ (Luhmann,
1995, p. 479). In Luhmann’s view, an awareness
of circularity of reason is the key to a normative
practice for observing reality:
If one in turn justifies the reasons and keeps
every step of this process open to critique and
ready for revision, it becomes more improb-
ably that such an edifice could have been
constructed without reference to reality. The
circularity is not eliminated. It is used,
unfolded, de-tautologized. Without this fun-
damental self reference all knowledge would
collapse (Luhmann, 1995, p. 479).
The first step in de-tautologizing of knowledge
is to ‘focus on social rather than psychic systems’
since these ‘can be psychologically decondi-
tioned’ (Luhmann, 1995, p. 484). Luhmann is
fully aware that the shift to the social sphere does
not solve the problem of reflexivity. As he writes:
Even the social systems of society and of
science are only self-conditioning autopoietic
systems of a special kind. They observe andSyst. Res.24, 323^332 (2007)
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not sublate the relativity, in principle, of all
observation and description to a system . . .
(Luhmann, 1995, p. 485).
His answer to the paradox of observing is
not, as Leydesdorff thinks, in the absolutism of
a super-observer. Rather, it is in a cautious
reminder that ‘questions of final justification can
only be answered within the self-referential
theories of self-referential systems’ and in ‘the
logic of universalistic theories that forces them
[theories] to test on themselves everything they
determine about their object’ (Luhmann, 1995,
p. 485). The direction for resolving the paradox of
observing pointed by Luhmann reveals modern
sensitivity toward reflexivity, self-referentiality,
recursivity and complexity. Yet it ultimately, too,
is not a solution since Luhmann does not define
the position from which one may be able to
observe simultaneously the object and the
process of observing.THE DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM IN
AUTOPOIESIS AND THE PROSPECTS
FOR RESOLVING THE PARADOX
OF OBSERVING
So the question remains: Is there a point from
which one could regulate and reflect on the
process of autopoiesis itself, not just a particular
autopoietic system?
In order to answer this question, a closer look
at the functioning of an autopoietic system is in
order. One example of the functioning of
autopoiesis is the development of intelligence
in children. The remarkable study by Piaget The
Origin of Intelligence in Children shows in great
detail how reflective intelligence develops from
sensory–motor operations (Piaget, 1998). For
Piaget, the starting point in this development
is reflex triggered by nerve signals. Neural
functions regulate and act recursively upon
physiological functions (for example, muscle
contraction); signals from neurons trigger the
exercise of physiological functions and thus help
to conserve them. The more often this triggeringCopyright  2007 JohnWiley & Sons,Ltd.
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tions are exercised, the more stable they are.
Thus the need to conserve physiological
functions creates the regulatory mechanism of
the neural networks which acts recursively on
these functions. The result is the development
of sensory–motor functions which, in turn,
also tend toward conservation. They conserve
themselves in two ways. First, they become
increasingly oriented toward external reality in
search of stimulation. This process evolves from
random groping to a more directed search for
stimuli which leads to a gradual construction of
the object on the level of sensory–motor oper-
ations (but not yet on the representational level).
As the growing number of objects are incorpor-
ated into sensory–motor schemes (the operation
which Piaget calls assimilation), the infant
becomes increasingly orientated toward the
exogenous sphere.
Second, sensory–motor operations conserve
themselves through mutual assimilation (for
example, tactile, audio, visual, gustatory, and
other functions). One example of such mutual
assimilation is an activation of audio functions by
visual ones, and vice versa (e.g. infants begin to
turn their head to catch the sight of the mother
when they hear her voice). Mutual assimilations
give rise to the construction of permanent mental
representations. This process is completed at the
beginning of the second year when infants begin
to look for objects that are hidden from a direct
view. The search for a hidden object signifies that
an infant has already constructed a permanent
mental image of the object.
Mental representations regulate sensory–
motor operations and act recursively on them.
The stabilization and conservation of mental
representations also requires a regulatory mech-
anism which is provided by symbolic operations.
The construction of symbolic operations is also a
two-pronged process which involves mental
operations and social interactions. There is a
circular dependence between the conservation of
mental representations and social relations. The
conservation of mental structures requires inter-
action among individuals on a much broader
scale than was possible or necessary prior to their
emergence. As many thinkers (including PiagetSyst. Res.24, 323^332 (2007)
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of mental structures is intimately related to
the development of social relations (Piaget,
1965; Vygotskii, 1978; 1929). The creation of
symbolic operations opens infinite possibilities in
constructing symbolic autopoietic systems (lin-
guistic, political, economic, legal, moral and
value systems etc.).
The above description shows that the process
of autopoiesis is sustained by two internally
generated operations—conservation and regu-
lation—which are dynamically interrelated.
Autopoietic systems are closed systems, which
conserve themselves through reproduction.
Conservation requires stability. In order to
stabilize themselves autopoietic systems require
a mechanism of regulation which, as the
above description shows, is generated internally.
The better the regulatory mechanism performs its
function, the better it handles perturbations,
including potential perturbations, the more
stable the system is and the better it is conserved.
In order to perform its function, the regulatory
mechanism also requires stabilization. The
stabilization of regulatory operations, in turn,
requires a regulatory mechanism which initially
lacks stability. With the stabilization of the new
mechanism, the system enters a new cycle of
equilibration and destabilization which, in turn,
requires re-equilibration. Thus the need to
conserve the autopoietic system results in con-
structing new levels of regulation. Since there is
no reason to suppose that at some level of
stabilization the need for conservation will
disappear, one must conclude that the construc-
tion of regulations of regulations will never cease.
Regulation is essentially a reflective operation.
The infinite perspective on the autopoietic
process may suggest, as it does to Luhmann,
that there is really no way to reflect on the process
of autopoiesis since for every reflective position
there will always be a possibility of constructing
another one. Every point of reflection can and
will be succeeded by another one, no less
embedded in the process of observing than its
predecessor. Should one conclude, then, that the
problem of the embedded observer cannot be
resolved and all that is left is to rely on palliatives,
such as Luhmann’s conditioning?Copyright  2007 JohnWiley & Sons,Ltd.
The Paradoxof ObservingIt is logically correct to regard the autopoietic
process itself as an autopoietic system. Just like
any other autopoietic system, it requires stabil-
ization and, therefore, regulation which offers a
possibility of reflection. If autopoiesis requires
regulation, there must exist a position from
which one should be able to reflect on the entire
process of autopoiesis.
As has been indicated earlier, conservation and
regulation are at the heart of the process of
autopoiesis. Conservation of functional oper-
ations requires regulation. In the initial stages of
their development the regulatory mechanism is
unstable. In order to acquire stability, it needs a
regulatory mechanism of its own. As the new
mechanism stabilizes itself, the autopoietic pro-
cess enters a new cycle. Thus the process of
autopoiesis involves constant oscillation between
equilibrium and disequilibrium. Both equi-
librium and disequilibrium are dynamically
related in the evolution of autopoiesis. The
repetition of the cycle eventually leads to the
improvement of the function of regulation and
the process of autopoiesis becomes increasingly
more stable, despite constant changes. One can
probably best describe this dynamic stability as
homeorhesis—the term that was introduced by
the biologist Conrad Waddington—rather
than homeostasis. Homeorhesis is not a static
condition but a stable equilibrium between
equilibrium and disequilibrium. This dynamic
balance has a function of regulation and, as a
regulatory operation, offers a possibility of
reflecting on the functioning of the system as a
whole.
This paper has a limited goal. Its scope does
not allow the full elaboration of the epistemology
of observing the observing. It has merely argued
that it is possible for an observer to reflect on
the process of one’s own autopoiesis and that the
paradox of observing, which is at the core of the
contemporary controversy in social sciences, can
be resolved. The observer who observers the
autopoietic process from the vantage point of the
dynamic equilibrium between equilibrium and
disequilibrium can observe and reflect upon
every stage of the autopoietic process, including
his or her own autopoiesis. Such reflective
position offers a possibility to provide anSyst. Res.24, 323^332 (2007)
DOI:10.1002/sres
331
RESEARCHPAPER Syst. Res.objective and empirically oriented reconstruction
of isomorphic instantiations of the complex
process of autopoietic construction of life forms,
social systems, knowledge and beyond.REFERENCES
Appleby J, Hunt L, Jacob M. 1994. Telling the Truth
about History. Norton: New York.
Delanty G. 1997. Habermas and occidental rationalism:
the politics of identity, social learning, and the cul-
tural limits of moral universalism. Sociological Theory
15: 30–59.
Habermas J. 1979. Communication and the Evolution of
Society. Beacon Press: Boston.
Habermas J. 1985. Theory of Communicative Action. 2
Vols. Beacon Press: Boston.
Jenkins K. 2000. A Postmodern reply to Perez Zagorin.
History and Theory 39: 181–200.
Knodt E. 1995. Forward in Social Systems, Niklas Luh-
mann. Stanford University Press: Stanford.
Leydesdorff L. 2000. Luhmann, Habermas and the
theory of communication. Systems Research and Beha-
vioral Science 17: 273–288.
Luhmann N. 1995. Social Systems. Stanford University
Press: Stanford.
Maturana H. 1974 [1999]. The organization of the living:
a theory of the living organization. International Journal
of Human-Computer Studies 51: 149–168.Copyright  2007 JohnWiley & Sons,Ltd.
332Maturana H. 1978. Biology of language: the epistem-
ology of reality. In Psychology and Biology of Language
and Thought: Essays in Honor of Eric Lenneberg,
Miller G, Lenneberg E (eds). Academic Press: New
York.
Maturana H. 1988. Ontology of Observing: The
Biological Foundations of Self-Consciousness and
the Physical Domain of Existence. http://www.
inteco.cl/biology/ontology/index.htm [January27,
2002].
Novick Peter. 1999. That Noble Dream: The ‘‘Objectivity
Question’’ and the American Historical Profession. Cam-
bridge University Press: Cambridge.
Piaget J. 1965. The Moral Judgment of the Child. The Free
Press: New York.
Piaget J. 1971. Biology and Knowledge: An Essay on
the Relations between Organic Regulations and Cogni-
tive Processes. The University of Chicago Press:
Chicago.
Piaget J. 1998. The Origin of Intelligence in Children.
International Universities Press: Madison.
Vygotskii L. 1978. Mind in Society: The Development of
Higher Psychological Processes. Harvard University
Press: Cambridge.
Vygotsky L. 1929. http://www.marxists.org/archive/
vygotsky/works/1929/cultural_development.htm
[Sept.24, 2004].
Zagorin P. 1998. History, the referent, and narrative:
reflection on postmodernism now. History and
Theory 38: 1–25.
Zagorin P. 2000. Rejoinder to a postmodernist. History
and Theory 39: 201–209.Syst. Res.24, 323^332 (2007)
DOI:10.1002/sres
Gennady Shkliarevsky
